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MEAns or EnD?  
on thE vAluAtion oF logic DiAgrAMs
Resume: From the beginning of the 16th century to the end of the 18th century, there were not less 
than ten philosophers who focused extensively on Venn’s ostensible analytical diagrams, as noted 
by modern historians of logic (Venn, Gardner, Baron, Coumet et al.). But what was the reason for 
early modern philosophers to use logic or analytical diagrams? Among modern historians of logic 
one can find two theses which are closely connected to each other: M. Gardner states that since the 
Middle Ages certain logic diagrams were used just in order to teach “dull-witted students”. There-
fore, logic diagrams were just a means to an end. According to P. Bernard, the appreciation of 
logic diagrams had not started prior to the 1960s, therefore the fact that logic diagrams become 
an end the point of research arose very late. The paper will focus on the question whether logic 
resp. analytical diagrams were just means in the history of (early) modern logic or not. In contrast 
to Gardner, I will argue that logic diagrams were not only used as a tool for “dull-witted students”, 
but rather as a tool used by didactic reformers in early modern logic. In predating Bernard’s thesis, 
I will argue that in the 1820s logic diagrams had already become a value in themselves in Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s lectures on logic, especially in proof theory.
Keywords: symbolic logic, diagrammatic reasoning, visual reasoning, proof theory, Euler diagrams, 
Venn diagrams.
Йенс Лемански
СредСТво или ЦелЬ?  
К иСТории оЦеноК логичеСКиХ диаграММ
Резюме: С начала XVI в. до конца XVIII в. не менее десятка философов активно работали 
с наглядными аналитическими диаграммами венна, что отмечается современными истори-
ками логики (дж. венном, М. Гарднером, М. Барон, Э. кумэ и др.). но что заставляло фило-
софов нового времени использовать логические или аналитические диаграммы? Среди со-
временных историков логики распространены два убеждения, тесно связанные между собой: 
М. Гарднер утверждает, что со времён средневековья некоторые логические диаграммы 
использовались просто для того, чтобы учить «твердолобых школяров». в таком случае 
логические диаграммы оказывались всего лишь средством для достижения цели. Согласно 
П. Бернарду, логические диаграммы не были оценены по достоинству до 1960-х гг., так что 
целью исследования логические диаграммы стали очень поздно. настоящая статья посвя-
щена вопросу о том, были ли логические (соответственно, аналитические) диаграммы в 
истории (ранне)новоевропейской логики всего лишь средством или нет. в противоположность 
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Гарднеру, мы покажем, что логические диаграммы использовались не только как инструмент 
для «твердолобых школяров», но скорее как инструмент, которым пользовались реформато-
ры преподавания логики в ранненовоевропейский период. отодвигая назад временну́ю 
оценку Бернарда, мы покажем, что уже в 1820-х гг. логические диаграммы стали ценностью 
сами по себе в лекциях а. Шопенгауэра по логике, особенно в теории доказательств.
Ключевые слова: символическая логика, диаграмматическое рассуждение, визуальное рас-
суждение, теория доказательств, диаграммы Эйлера, диаграммы венна.1. introduction
Nowadays logic diagrams — especially Venn’s so-called “analytical diagrams” which 
share a family resemblance with Euler’s diagrams and his own ones — are enjoying in-
creasing popularity amongst philosophers, information scientists, mathematicians and many 
others. If one is to believe general introductions to logic, this appreciation of logic diagrams 
has not always been the case in history. The standard history of logic diagrams is as follows: 
Before the 18th century, there were just some tree diagrams, squares of opposition amongst 
others which had no significant role for logical reasoning and representation. However, 
in the 18th century Leonhard Euler invented analytical diagrams in the form of circles 
in order to make logical reasoning and representation more illustrative to non-logicians. 
In the following decades, analytical diagrams were continued by, inter alia, John Venn, 
Charles S. Peirce, Lewis Carroll, Warren McCulloch and now we use them in the form of 
Randolph-diagrams, Spider-diagrams, Karnaugh maps and so on in order to illustrate set 
containment, to calculate with many variables, and to verify proofs. According to the pre-
vailing opinion, the benefits of analytical diagrams were only recognized in the last decades.
In his paradigmatic work Symbolic Logic, John Venn already alleged that there was 
a tradition before Euler using logic diagrams, specifically, the use of analytical ones. From 
the beginning of the 16th century to the end of the 18th century, there were no less than 
ten philosophers who focused extensively on analytical diagrams; each of these scholars 
having developed an original form of diagrammatic reasoning in logic. Yet, what was the 
reason for logicians in modern history to use logic diagrams at all? 
Among modern historians of logic two theses, which are closely connected to each 
other, can be determined: some state that logic diagrams have been used since antiquity, 
or at least since the Middle Ages in order to teach “dull-witted students”. Therefore, 
logic diagrams were just a means to an end in history, whereas others say that the ap-
preciation of analytical diagrams in logic had not emerged before the 1960s. Thus it arose 
very late that logic diagrams become a value in itself. 
In the present paper, I will at first illustrate the prevailing opinions of historians of log-
ic concerning the valuation of logic diagrams in history (sect. 2). After that, I will focus on 
the question whether logic diagrams and particularly analytical ones, were just a means in 
the history of modern logic. Accordingly, I will combine the widely scattered information 
on the history of logic diagrams starting in the times of the printing press, until the time 
when logic diagrams first became the point to research for researchers. (1) In discussing the 
first thesis, I will argue that analytical diagrams were not only an auxiliary tool for “dull-
witted students”, but rather an instrument utilized by didactic reformers in early modern 
logic (sect. 3). (2) In addition to the second thesis, I will argue that already in Arthur Scho-
penhauer’s lectures on logic in the 1820s, the value of logic diagrams increased, triggering 
a unique development in the history of how logic diagrams were received (sect. 4).
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It is a well-known fact that logic diagrams were used since antiquity. Some historians 
are interpreting relevant passages of Plato (Parm. 131b) or Aristotle (An. pr. 43b) as an in-
dication for the use of logical diagrams and in particular, Euler diagrams (cf. e.g. [Ueber-
weg 1871: 134 et seqq.; Stekeler-Weithofer 1986: 27–88; Flannery 1995: 1, 41]). Explic-
itly one can find a reference to logic diagrams in the works of Augustine of Hippo (Conf. 
IV 16), and since the Middle Ages, logic diagrams such as the square of opposition 
(quadrata formula), the bridge of asses (pons asinorum) and some kind of tree diagrams 
(arbor prophyriana/scientia), had become popular. 
If one wants to know why these diagrams became popular during the Middle Ages, 
one can find a thesis in Martin Gardner’s influential book Logic Machines and Diagrams. 
In this book, Gardner tells the story of the development from simple handwritten diagrams 
to complex digital computers, and within this account one can find an explanation for 
the invention of new logical diagrams in the middle ages:
Jean Buridan, the fourteenth century French nominalist, was much concerned in his 
logical writings with finding middle terms, and his method became known as a “pons 
asinorum” (“bridge of asses”) because it helped dull-witted students pass over from the 
major and minor terms to the middle ones. […] In later centuries, pons asinorum became 
a common phrase for Euclid’s fifth proposition proving the base angles of an isosceles 
triangle to be equal, a bridge that only stupid students had difficulty in crossing. [Gardner 
1958: 30; my italics]
Obviously this passage does not refer to all kind of diagrams, but rather only to the so-
called “bridge of asses”. Nevertheless, this passage was often quoted by historians of 
philosophy in order to explain that logical diagrams in general have been used since the 
Middle Ages for the sake of teaching dull-witted students. For example, in the history of 
logic diagrams written by Margaret E. Baron, Gardner’s opinion about “pontes asinorum” 
has been adopted and linked with the claim that analytical diagrams were just used as 
a teaching aid (cf. [Baron 1969]). Let’s allow this thesis (that considers Euler diagrams 
as a mere tool for dull-witted students) to be called the Gardner/Baron-thesis.
Another thesis which is closely connected to the first one was put forward by Peter 
Bernhard. Bernhard illustrates that visual reasoning and representation were rehabilitated 
by the so-called “Imagic turn” from the middle of the 20th century. Indications of this can 
be found in the work of Gardner, but also in the developments of the 1960s, such as the 
Visual Inference Laboratory (Bloomington/ Indiana), which lead to current imaging sci-
ence. For Bernhard, especially since the enormous multiplication of the efficiency of data 
processing systems had enabled an increasingly better integration of graphic elements in 
user interfaces, this invigorated a new research interest in graphic modelling and process-
ing of information.
Bernhard’s thesis on the current positive valuation of logic diagrams depends mostly 
on the development in computer science since the 1960s. Furthermore, Catherine Legg 
has argued that there was a “picture shock” in the 19th century, peaking at the time of 
David Hilbert’s and Alfred Jules Ayer’s works; although over the last few decades logi-
cians and mathematicians have recognized that logic diagrams are more than a heuristic 
aid (cf. [Legg 2013]) In addition to Bernhard and Legg, one can say that from the late 
1960s to the early 1970s two other movements engaged with diagrammatic reasoning and 
101Логико-философские штудии. Вып. 14
J. Lemanski. Means or end? On the Valuation of Logic Diagrams
representation have appeared: the “New Math Movement” (especially in set diagrams), 
and the “Proof without words movement” (with an interest in visual proofs with the help 
of diagrams). (Cf. e.g. the two representative works, [Murphy 1968: 8–25; Isaacs 1975].) 
Let us call this thesis the Bernhard/Legg-thesis.
By interpreting these short passages based on general historical claims regarding the 
history of logic diagrams, I am not certain whether I do justice to Gardner, Baron, Bern-
hard or Legg. But for the heuristic purpose of an examination of the history of Euler dia-
grams in (early) modern logic, I will use both theses as I have interpreted them above. 
Both theses are closely connected to each other and complementary, since the result of the 
Gardner/Baron-thesis is the point of departure from the Bernhard/Legg-thesis: the scep-
ticism regarding logic diagrams until the middle of the 20th century. Thus, we can conclude 
that the prevailing opinion on the value of Euler diagrams is the following: until the 
middle of the 20th century, logic diagrams were just auxiliary means or heuristic tools, 
whereas since the middle of the 20th century logic, and especially analytical diagrams 
become more and more an own end and purpose of logical research.3. valuation of logic diagrams until the 1820s
In the current section, I would like to verify whether the Gardner/Baron-thesis can be 
substantiated. However, I will not start in the Middle Ages, but rather in the times of the 
printing press. There are several reasons for choosing this method: although there are some 
promising candidates (cf. i.a. [Nolan 2002: 282; Edwards 2006]), it is not fully clarified by 
current research whether we find any analytical diagrams in textbooks of the Middle Ages. 
However, I have some doubts as to whether there were Euler-Venn diagrams in the Middle 
Ages. Secondly, as far as I know there are not any thoughts on the use and valuation of 
analytical diagrams in the work of those promising candidates (and it is already difficult to 
find considerations on this topic in modern and early modern logic). Thirdly, the history of 
analytical diagrams starting from the times of the printing press is better explored at present.
For that reason, I have collected the information regarding the history of analytical 
diagrams from relevant literature [Venn 1894: 504–527 (= chap. XX. II); Ziehen 1920: 
227–236 (= § 54); Gardner 1958; Baron 1969; Coumet 1977; Bernhard 2001: 69–80 
(cf. also index); Moktefi, Shin 2012] and created a repository of historical texts which 
can be found via the following link: http://blog.fernuni-hagen.de/euler-venn-diagrams/.
According to this repository, a list can be found of at least ten logicians before Euler 
and a lot of successors who anticipated or continued the tradition of visual and diagram-
matic reasoning and representation in logic. Having read these texts in chronological 
order these texts regarding to the question of what was the reason for them to use ana-
lytical diagrams at all. I should say at once that all logicians until the 1820s state — if they 
are even reflecting on what they do — that diagrams are just the auxiliary means to the 
end of verbal logical reasoning, and only the Gardner/Baron-thesis appears to be justified. 
Yet, as we will see in the following, I have not found any hint in early modern logic texts 
that logical diagrams are anywhere used in order to teach dull-witted students. In the fol-
lowing sections, in each case some quotes will be provided on what logicians such as 
Erhard Weigel (sect. 3.1), Gottfried Ploucquet, Johann Heinrich Lambert (3.2), Leonhard 
Euler (3.3) and Johann Gebhard Ehrenreich Maaß (3.4) have said on their use of ana-
lytical diagrams. As a result (sect. 3.5), I will give a hypothesis on the use of analytical 
diagrams which presents an argument against the Gardner/Baron-thesis.
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One of the first logicians in the history of logic who reflected extensively on the use 
of analytical diagrams was Erhard Weigel. Since 1653, Weigel was professor for math-
ematics in Jena and among his students were Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Johann 
Christoph Sturm, who are well known for their use of logic diagrams (cf. [Lemanski 
forthcoming]).
Analysing chronologically, we find analytical diagrams in Weigel’s books not be- 
fore 1693, in his Philosophia Mathematica. In this opus magnum, Weigel uses espe-
cially initial letters such as A, B and C that are connected or separated due to their rela-
tion in order to depict syllogisms. Weigel calls his invention “Logometrum” [Weige- 
lus 1693: I, 122; II, 105]. For instance, we see in fig. 1 Weigel’s illustration of the 
modi 
Barbara (∀xAx → Cx, ∀xCx → Bx ⊨ ∀xAx → Bx) 
and 
Celarent (¬$xBx ˄ Cx, ∀xAx → Cx ⊨ ¬$xBx ˄ Ax) 
(cf. [Weigelius 1693: II, 165]).
Although these diagrams were published in 1693, Weigel has reflected on the use 
of the Logometrum already in his book Idea Matheseos universae, published in 1669. 
In this book there is a passage in which Weigel describes his invention of the Logometrum 
and reflects on its value and purpose:
§ 17. Factum hinc est, ut veteres Ma- 
thematici quantorum abstractam ra- 
tionem non abstracte, nec, ut directa 
methodus exigit, catholicis proposi-
tionibus, & quae sunt kath auto; sed 
quasi concrete tantum, indirecta meth-
odo, per lineas & figuras, tanquam per 
clariorem speciem doctrinae gratia 
tradiderint, quod ex Euclidis libro tum 
secundo, tum quinto, nemo non agnos-
cit.
§ 17. From here it is a fact that the old math-
ematicians have taught the abstract ratio of 
quantities not in an abstract manner and also 
not, as it is required by the direct method, 
in universal and through itself certain proposi-
tions. But rather in a quasi-concrete manner, 
due to an indirect method, viz. by using lines 
and figures, for the sake of a clearer form of 
doctrine; this method is commonly accepted, 
in accordance with Euclids second and fifth 
book [sc. Elements]. 
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§ 18. Data mihi hinc est occasio co- 
gitandi, annon ad alia quaedam ge- 
neraliora facilius tradenda similiter 
adhiberi possint lineae vel figurae: 
Et illico vim earum in ipsis logicis 
Syllagisationibus alioquin abstractiss-
mis expertus sum. [Weigelius 1669: 46; 
my italics]
§ 18. Thus the opportunity was bestowed upon 
me to reflect whether or not — for the purpose 
of an easier explanation of certain other more 
general relations — it is possible to use lines 
and figures in a similar manner; and immedi-
ately I had proved the strength of those [sc. lines 
and figures] at precisely theses Syllogisations, 
which are otherwise very abstract.
In § 17 of the quote, Weigel uses two combined argumenta auctoritatis as a justifica-
tion for his own logical invention which is presented in § 18 of the quote. The first argu-
mentum is as follows: the “old mathematicians” have taught the abstract ratio of quantities 
(rationes quantorum), in a concrete manner in order to make their doctrine clearer. 
The second agumentum auctoritatis is a justification of the old mathematician’s method, 
a concrete method which is commonly accepted since it is in accordance with Euclid. 
It stands to reason that Weigel indicates with “rationes quantorum” to Eudoxosʼs doctrine 
of proportions (abstract), which is especially given in the fifth book of Euclid’s Elements 
(concrete).
When Weigel introduces his own invention of analytical diagrams in § 18, this inven-
tion is directly justified by the method of the “old mathematicians” and indirectly justified 
by Euclid. Since if Weigel’s usage of the Logometrum in logic is as tangible as the 
method of the old mathematicians in the doctrine of propositions, and if the old mathema-
ticians are as exact in their presentation as Eudoxos with his doctrine in the Elements, 
then Weigel indicates that both premises of his logic are as tangible as Euclid’s geometry. 
A further analogy between Weigel and Euclid can be seen in the factual justification and 
evaluation of analytical diagrams: the old mathematicians have used visual geometry “for 
the sake of a clearer form of doctrine”. In a similar way, Weigel explains that he has used 
the Logometrum “for the purpose of an easier explanation of certain other more general 
relations [sc. in logic]”. Thus, analytical diagrams have no ends in themselves, but rather 
they are a means for simplification.
Finally, the question then arises whether Weigel’s Logometrum is restricted to special 
diagrammatic forms. § 18 indicates that he uses concrete geometrical forms (in accordance 
with Euclid) in order to make Syllogism’s abstracts appear more tangible. Weigel speaks 
about “lines and figures”, perhaps indicating one-dimensional line diagrams, or some 
other figures which could be two-dimensional. Since Leibniz has used line diagrams to-
gether with circle diagrams in order to represent syllogisms (cf. [Wolters 1980: 132]) and 
Sturm has used circle diagrams, explicitly on behalf of Weigel, it is likely that Weigel’s 
idea of the Logometrum is not restricted to initial diagrams. The following sentences shed 
light on Weigel’s idea: 
agnovi tandem, non gratis Aristote-
lem in Syllogismis tradendis usum 
esse vocibus Geomtrarum, (πέρας, 
σύνδεσμος, σχῆμα) sed omnes Syllo-
gismorum modos per schemata figu-
rasque geometricas multo facilius dis-
cerni, quam per Barbara, Celarent,
Finally, I have discovered that Aristotle had not 
only good reasons for using terms of the geo- 
meters (boundary, connection, scheme) in order 
to describe the traditional syllogisms, but 
also that all modi of the syllogisms can be 
learned more easily by means of geometrical 
schemes and figures than by Barbara, Celarent
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multoque succinctius demonstrari 
(vulgo reduci) posse, quam per τὸ 
Phoebifer axis obit terras athramque 
quotannis: adeò quidem ut, vera sit 
an falsa syllogisandi forma per nu-
dam coincidentiam vel discoinciden-
tiam sive distantiam figuralem ip- 
sarum saltem literarum initialium 
cujusque termini (non enim opus est 
ut sint circuli vel Triangula) […] 
[Weigelius 1669: 46]
and can be demonstrated (or reduced) in much 
shorter form than by Phoebifer axis obit terras 
aethramque quotannis; so much so that — equal-
ly whether it may be a correct or incorrect form 
of syllogisation —, hereby it will be possible that 
they [sc. the modi of syllogisms] can be found out 
immediately and in an instant by means of the 
mere coincidence or discoincidence, i.e. by means 
of the figurative distance of at least the initial let-
ters itself or its boundary (viz. it is not important 
that they are circles or even triangles) […]
This quote demonstrates that Weigel is aware of various forms of logic diagrams, 
speaking explicitly of circles, triangles or initial letters, while reflecting on the function 
of analytical diagrams defined by the terms “coincidence” and “discoincidence”. Further-
more, one can find some line diagrams in Weigel’s work which are described by the 
logical vocabulary of the Logometrum (cf. [Weigelius 1693: II, esp. 104–105, 112]). It is 
also interesting to note that Weigel repeats his remark concerning the purpose and value 
of analytical diagrams, in contrast to the scholastic method, whereby syllogisms can 
“be learned more easily by means of geometrical schemes and figures than by Barbara, 
Celarent”, and they can be “demonstrated (or reduced) in much shorter form than by 
Phoebifer axis obit terras aethramque quotannis”.2 Even if analytical diagrams are much 
easier and shorter than the mnemonic terms and verses of the scholastic method, Weigel 
does not say that analytical diagrams have a purpose. 
Ultimately, Weigel appears as a didactic reformer who justifies his new logical me thod 
by referring to the antique authority of Euclid. The analytical diagrams he had in mind 
are not an end to research, but rather an auxiliary tool for reasoning. They are easier and 
shorter than the scholastic methods. Nevertheless, Weigel denied that those diagram-
matic forms of reasoning and representation are a kind of “pons asinorum”. On the con-
trary, he claimed that the Logometrum and some other diagrams used in the Principia 
Mathematica are a “pons sapientum” [Weigelius 1693: II, 10, 62, 172 et seq.].3.2. gottfried Ploucquet (1716–1790)  
and Johann heinrich lambert (1728–1777)
Although line diagrams can be found already in the works of Bartholomäus Kecker-
mann, Johann Heinrich Alsted, Weigel and Leibniz, in the historiography of geometrical 
logician, Johann Heinrich Lambert, he is normally said to be the originator of line diagrams 
in the manner of analytical diagrams (cf. [Keckermannus 1601: 91 (= III, I 3); Kecker-
mannus 1611: 426 (= III, I 6); Alstedius 1614: 395 (= VII, IV 1)]). Lambert’s line diagrams 
were published 1764 in his Neues Organon, oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und 
Bezeichnung des Wahren. In the same year, Lambert became the government building 
officer of the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin and was in close contact with 
Leonhard Euler.
During the 1750s and 1760s Gottfried Ploucquet had also worked on analytical dia-
grams. Since 1750, Ploucquet was Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University 
2 For an explanation of the mnemonic verse “Febiferaxis obit terras…” cf. [John of St. Thomas 1955: 119].
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of Tübingen. In Ploucquet’s book from 1759, Fvndamanta Philosophiæ Speculativæ, 
we can find three nested squares in order to illustrate the nota notae principle:
Ex intuitione patet, P esse prædicatum 
omnis M, & M esse prædicatum omnis S. 
Sed prædicatum prædicati est prædicatum 
Subjecti. P itaque est prædicatum omnis 
S, id quod ita exprimitur: Omne S est P. 
[Ploucquet 1759: 25 (= § 71)]
By intuition it openly emerges that P is the 
predicate of all M, & M is the predicate of 
all S. But the predicate of the predicate is 
the predicate of the subject. P is therefore 
the predicate of all S, so that is vividly 
demonstrated: All S is P.
Despite this quote, some years later a dispute concerning the original invention of an-
alytical diagrams arose between Ploucquet and Lambert. In 1762, Lambert had found in 
the municipal library of Zurich, called Wasserkirche (Water Church), an “old scholastic 
logic, or […] a Commentarius about the logic of Aristotle” with logical “figures in wood-
cuts”, which are used in order to illustrate “many terms and conditions”.3 The fact that 
he even sent a letter to Zurich six years later in order to inspect the book again, can be 
taken as an indication that the logical lines in his Neues Organon were motivated by this 
“scholastic logic”. An example of these lines as a relation of terms can be seen in the fol-
lowing drawing which is similar to Ploucquet’s ones:
The dispute between Lambert and Ploucquet on the origins of Eulerian diagrams 
began in 1765, with the short article on Georg Jonathan von Holland’s Treatise on Math-
ematics 1765, in which a comparison between Lambert’s method and the logical calcula-
tion invented by Ploucquet (“von Hrn. Prof. Ploucquet erfundene logikalische Rechnung”) 
can be found (cf. [Holland 1764]). In this treatise of Holland, the logical calculus of 
Ploucquet was favored. However, Lambert welcomed the fact that Holland had attempt-
ed to fix the “epochs of such arithmetic operations, so that, if once they will achieve the 
true perfection and usefulness, there will be a not such a bitter dispute concerning its 
invention, as it had happened due to the differential calculo” between Newton and Leib-
niz (cf. [Lambert 1765: 152]). Furthermore, Lambert asserted that he had invented the 
geometrical method in logic at least one year before the drafting of the Neues Organon — 
apparently he figured that Ploucquets method has emerged not before 1763/64. Although 
it was not until around the year 1770 that Lambert noticed that books were using ana-
lytical diagrams in about 1700 (cf. [Lambert 1771: 128, furthermore XIII, XXI]).
3 Johann Heinrich Lambert an Johann Jakob Steinbrüchel, 14.4.1768, in: [Bernoulli 1782: 403–408].
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Despite issues with dates, a consideration of the purpose and advantage of analytical 
diagrams is given by Lambert in his review of Holland’s treatise:
Des Herrn [Georg Jonathan von] Hollands 
Abhandlung [Über die Mathematik, 1764] 
habe ich hierauf, und mit vielem Vergnügen 
durchgelesen. […] Besonders vergnügte mich 
die auf der 28sten Seite befindliche kurze An-
merkung, welche ungefähr sagen will: man 
könne nur in der Geometrie zu einer völligen 
Gewisheit gelangen, aber es sey dieselbe der 
allgemeinen Sage nach den meisten Menschen 
zu schwer, und unter den Wissenschaften die 
schwerste; und hieraus könne man den Schluß 
machen, wie sehr man sich den anderen Wis-
senschaften mit dem Schein der Wahrheit und 
leeren Worte begnüge. In der That sieht man 
dieses besonders an solchen Metaphysikern, 
welche die Geometrie nach den Begriffen ihrer 
Metaphysik einrichten wollen. Man hat da 
noch Mittel, die Ungereimtheiten zu entdeck-
en, weil die Geometrie die Fehlschlüsse bald 
verräth. [Lambert 1765: 150; my italics]
I have read the treatise [On Mathematics, 
1764] of Mr. [Georg Jonathan von] Hol-
land with a lot of pleasure. […] Par- 
ticularly, I have had great satisfaction 
from the short comment on page 28, that 
roughly says: one can only come to com-
plete certainty only in geometry, but it 
is, as is generally known, too difficult 
for most people and also the most chal-
lenging science of all. On this basis one 
can draw the conclusion of how much 
all other sciences content themselves 
with the shadow of truth and with idle 
words. Indeed, one can especially see 
this as these metaphysicians try to build 
up geometry with the concepts of meta-
physics. There, one can adapt the means 
in order to discover the inconsistencies, 
since geometry soon reveals fallacies.
It is striking that this quotation speaks about analytical diagrams as a means, and 
not as an end. For Lambert, geometrical diagrams are an auxiliary tool in order to detect 
logical fallacies. However, Lambert’s claim that he had invented analytical diagrams 
is anachronistic for various reasons. Firstly, we can find analytical diagrams in early 
modern philosophy long before Lambert and Ploucquet: in printed books, the first ana-
lytical diagrams can be found in a chapter on syllogism in the second book of De cen-
sura veri et falsi in 1531, by Juan Luis Vives (cf. [Vives 1531: fol. 57v]). And in 1589, 
Nicolaus Reimarus Ursus published circle diagrams in his Metamorphosis Logicae 
(cf. [Raymarus Vrsus 1589: 32 et seqq.]). The second reason relates to the fact that 
Ploucquet had published his square diagrams already by 1759, so he was some years 
ahead of Lambert. Thus, in a response to Lambert, Ploucquet did not hesitate to “fix 
the epochs” more precisely:
Im Jahr 1758 kam ich auf den Gedanken 
die Schlüsse zu zeichnen, und in Figuren 
vorzustellen, um dieselbe auf eine an-
schauende Erkenntniß dergestalt zu brin-
gen, daß der genze Schluß mit einem Blik, 
ohne an Folgen zu gedenken, übersehen, 
mithin aller Zweifel wider die Untrüglich-
keit der Schlüsse gänzlich aufgehoben 
werde. Wenn z. Ex. alles M ein P. und alles 
S ein M ist: so ist, wenn man das Prädikat 
In the year 1758, I had the idea to depict 
conclusions and to present them in fig-
ures, in order to transform them into 
a visible knowledge, so that the whole 
syllogism can be overseen in one view, 
without thinking of the consequences; 
and so that the doubt against the infalli- 
bility of syllogisms is repealed. If, for 
example, all of M is P. and all of S is 
M, and if one interprets the predicate
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in einem bejahenden Saz als einen Theil 
von dem Begrif des Subjekts betrachtet, das 
P in M und das M in S enthalten. Folglich 
kann die Construction diese seyn [Ploucquet 
1766: 157; my italics]:
of an affirmative sentence as a part of the 
concept of the subject, P is contained in M 
and M is contained in S. Thus, the con-
struction can only be the following: 
This quote is not only interesting in regard to the given date of the said innovation, 
but also with regard to the reflection on the purpose and advantage of analytical diagrams. 
Even for Ploucquet, analytical diagrams are a means in order to make syllogistic reason-
ing easier and more certain. Similar to Weigel and Lambert, it seems that for Ploucquet 
logic diagrams cannot replace verbal syllogisms and they cannot be used without an ac-
companying explanatory. But they can help in avoiding fallacies since the observer is able 
to grasp a syllogism in just one view. 3.3. leonhard Euler (1707–1783)
Although Lambert and Ploucquet dispute on who was the inventor of geometrical 
diagrams in logic, nowadays spatial logic diagrams are commonly named after Leonhard 
Euler. Euler’s first manuscripts on analytical diagrams were written long before 1757.4 
Later, he presented circle diagrams in his Lettres à une princesse d’Allemagne sur divers 
sujets de physique et de philosophie, which was written in 1760–62 and published in 1768 
in Saint Petersburg. The analytical diagrams which are known today as Euler diagrams 
are presented in a longer passage on language, intermingling seamlessly with some letters 
on logical reasoning.
For Euler, language — and especially notions — are “formed by abstraction” from 
sensible impressions and “are the source of all our judgments and of all our reasoning” 
[Euler 1833: 338 (= L. CII)]. Consequently, from a current point of view, Euler’s phi-
losophy of language may be interpreted as a traditional form of compositionality which 
starts with conceptual atomism and connects, in a bottom-up manner, atomistic concepts 
to molecular judgements and judgments to holistic inferences. Within this triadic model — 
consisting of concepts, judgments and inferences — the molecular relational role of 
concepts in judgments play a significant role. For Euler, the formula of molecular rela-
tional concepts consists of “four species” (“quatre especes”): (1) Every A is B, (2) No A 
is B, (3) Some A is B and (4) Some A is not B. The two notions, A and B, which can be 
found in all species, and “contain an infinite number of individual objects, we may con-
sider it as a space in which they are all contained” [Euler 1833: 339 (= L. CII)]. If each 
concept, represented by variables such as A and B, has a specific space that comprehends 
a specific number of individual objects, the relation between those concepts can also be 
4 Санкт-Петербургский филиал архива Ран Ф. 136. оп. 1. № 134, 42 (cf. [кобзарь 2005]).
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illustrated by spaces or circles. Therefore, Euler illustrated the four species of relations 
of concepts in judgments in the following way:
After introducing these four types of concepts in judgments, Euler reflects on the 
benefits and value of his diagrams:
Ces figures rondes, ou plûtôt ces espaces 
(car il n’importe quelle figure nous leur 
donnions), sont très propres à nous facili-
ter nos réflexions sur cette matière, & à 
nous découvrir tous les mysteres dont on 
se vante dans la Logique, & qu'on y dé-
montre avec bien de la peine, pendant que 
par le moïen de ces signes tout saute 
d’abord aux yeux. [Euler 1768: 96–101 
(= L. CIIf.); my italics]
These circles, or rather these spaces, for 
it is of no importance of what figure they 
are of, are extremely commodious for fa-
cilitating our reflections on this subject, 
and for unfolding all the boasted myster-
ies of logic, which that art finds it so dif-
ficult to explain; whereas, by means of 
these signs, the whole is rendered sensible 
to the eye. [Euler 1833: 340 (= L. CIII); 
my italics]
Although this is the only existing small quote on the value of logic diagrams in the 
work of Euler, it is of much interest regarding the Gardner/Baron-thesis. On the one hand, 
the quote reveals that Euler interprets his diagrams as a means for an easier and shorter 
form of logical reasoning. Furthermore, it is remarkable that Euler does not stress a direct 
analogy between logical reasoning and his diagrams, for he only speaks about the reflec-
tion on logical reasoning with the help of diagrams. This can be interpreted as a sign of 
metalogical reasoning using Eulerian diagrams, viz. they cannot replace or compensate 
the conceptual reasoning itself. But on the other hand, the quote does not indicate that 
Euler sees these diagrams as an auxiliary tool to teach dull-witted students. The benefit 
of circle diagrams as a metalogical tool can be found in the last subsentence of Euler’s 
quote: with diagrams the whole syllogism, logical reasoning is given in only one look. 3.4. Johann gebhard Ehrenreich Maass (1766–1823)
Since 1791, Johann Gebhard Ehrenreich Maaß was an extraordinary professor of phi-
losophy at the University in Halle. He not only taught philosophy, but also mathematics 
and rhetorics. Similar to the contemporary logician Johann August Heinrich Ulrichs who 
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also used some line diagrams,5 he was sceptical of the transcendental philosophy of Kant 
and makes use of analytical diagrams. The textbook in which we find analytical diagrams 
in triangular shapes is entitled Grundriß der Logik and has been printed in four editions 
between 1793 and 1823. 
The Grundriß der Logik is divided in three parts, (1) pure logic, (2) applied logic 
and (3) practical logic. In the introduction of the book, Maaß claims that pure and 
practical logic are organized in a systematic manner and are complementary. In contrast, 
the applied logic rests on “empirical principles” borrowed from psychology. In this 
context, which accounts for a large part of the introduction, while Maaß compares 
his logic diagrams with his predecessors, but also criticizes the method of Euler and 
Lambert:
 
Vorzuͤglich erwarte ich hier [sc. in der ange-
wandten Logik] das Urtheil der Kenner uͤber 
die neue Art, die Verhaͤltnisse der Begriffe, 
die Urtheile und Schluͤsse durch Zeichnun- 
gen anschaulich darzustellen (§. 365–381.). 
Bekanntlich haben Euler und Lambert das 
naͤmliche versucht. Die Eulerische Erfindung 
ist nicht brauchbar; die Lambertsche ist zwar 
viel vollkommener, allein noch immer fehlt 
den Zeichen, deren sich Lambert bediente, 
die vollstaͤndige Analogie mit dem Bezeich-
neten. [Maaß 1793: IX et seq.]
Here [sc. in the applied logic], I espe-
cially expect the criticism of the experts 
on the new kind of illustrative presenta-
tion of the ratios of concepts, judgments 
and conclusions by drawings (§. 365–
381.). As is well known, Euler and Lam-
bert have tried the same thing. The Eule-
rian invention is not useful; The Lam- 
bertian is indeed much more perfect, 
but the signs, which are used by Lam-
bert, are still missing the perfect anal-
ogy with the signified.
The point, which Maaß criticizes, is still seen as problematic, especially in modern 
ontology (cf. [van Invagen, Sullivan 2016: sect. 2.2]). Subsequent to the quote, Maaß 
claims that Lambert tries to illustrate two metaphors which are mutually exclusive: 
(1) A concept is “falling under” another one, and (2) concepts have an “extension.” Only 
if both metaphors can be illustrated in one diagram, a perfect analogy between the sign 
and the signified emerges. Lambertian line diagrams illustrate the metaphor of extension 
by the specific length of each line, on the one hand, and the metaphor of falling under by 
the lines written among each other, on the other hand. However, Lambertian’s line dia-
grams cannot perfectly illustrate both metaphors in equal measures. The argument against 
Lambert’s lines (which can, for Maaß, actually apply to Euler in a greater extent) is that 
the extensional dimension of diagrams says that i.e. A and B are identical, whereas the 
lines written among each other illustrate that both concepts are repectively different to each 
other.
It will not be discussed here whether this argument is convincing or not — how-
ever it seems to be one of the first important criticisms of Eulerian diagrams, indicating 
that for Maaß diagrams are just an illustration of verbal reasoning and representation. 
Maaß himself tries to solve this problem by combining the extensional function 
of Eulerian diagrams with the function of falling under in Lambertian line diagrams 
by using triangles:
5 Cf. [Vlrich 1792: 171]. In 1790s, analytical diagrams were also used by Johann Gottfried Kiesewetter 
[Kiesewetter 1793]; W. L. G. Freyherr von Eberstein [Eberstein 1794].
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In his applied logic, Maaß comes back to his reflection on logical diagrams after hav-
ing made some general points upon applied logic, conceptual formation and semiology. 
As an introduction to his new method of logic, Maaß defines in § 364 that a full analogy 
between the sign and the signified is given if all what applies to the sign is also true 
of the signified. After that definition he deliberates the benefits and value of these signs, 
so providing in the following paragraphs examples of the full analogy between the sign 
and the signified by describing his analytical diagrams:
Ein solches Zeichen stellt uns das Bezeich-
nete gleichsam vor Augen, und befördert also 
ungemein die Deutlichkeit und Evidenz der 
Erkenntnis von dem letzeren: […] Inzwisch-
en hat doch das Zeichen, außer dem angefüh-
rten Nutzen, auch noch den, daß es die Er-
findung neuer Wahrheiten erleichtert, indem 
es uns das Bezeichnete in allen seinen Ver-
haͤltnissen gleichsam mit einem Blicke uͤber-
sehen laͤßt. [Maaß 1793: 245 et seq.]
Such a sign places the designated be-
fore our eyes, and therefore, exception-
ally supports the clarity and evidence 
of knowledge of the latter: […] By now, 
the sign has, except the above men-
tioned advantage, also the benefit that 
it makes the invention of new truths 
more easier, so that the signified can 
be overseen in one view with all it rela-
tions.
Additionally, from Maaß’s quote it can be deduced that analytical diagrams are a means 
in order to support clarity and evidence. Particularly, the fact that via diagrams the signi-
fied designated can be overseen in one view, recalls Euler’s reflections on the purpose of 
his own diagrams. A new insight can be deduced from the idea that diagrams make the 
“invention of new truths easier”. It is necessary to pay attention to the exact wording: 
Maaß does not say that Eulerian diagrams are an auxiliary tool in order to invent new 
truths; rather, he states that this invention becomes easier by using diagrams. Thus, the role 
diagrams or signs in general play in the case of invention it has not been explicitly con-
ceived. 
All in all, Maaß’s reflection on Eulerian diagrams is far from an instruction on dull-
witted students. His criticism of Euler and Lambert indicates that the use of and the 
consideration of logic diagrams become a more and more specialized issue with more 
and more criteria that have to be fulfilled by authors using diagrams in logic.3.5. conclusion and hypothesis
The so-called Gardner/Baron thesis states that logic diagrams were used by logicians 
in early modern philosophy just for the purpose of teaching dull-witted students or as 
a mere teaching aid. Therefore, logic diagrams are merely a means and lack a raison 
d’etre. At a close reading, the Gardner/Baron thesis is restricted chronologically to the 
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Middle Ages and systematically to the bridge of asses (pons asinorum). However, there 
are reasons to apply their thesis to analytical diagrams in (early) modern philosophy. 
On the one hand, the Gardner/Baron thesis is closely connected to the Bernhard/Legg-
thesis, claiming that logical diagrams became an end to research not long before the 1960s. 
That thesis can be interpreted as an argumentum e contrario of the Gardner/Baron-thesis. 
On the other hand, the writings of Gardner and Baron emphasize the connection between 
different kinds of logic diagrams, resulting from the transformations or complementation 
between logic diagrams which are only visibly different.
In section 3.1–3.4, I have tried to illustrate — namely on the basis of considerations 
by different authors between the 16th and 19th century — that Gardner and Baron are 
justified to interpret logic diagrams as a means, not as an end. The valuation of analytical 
diagrams can be found in the history of early modern philosophy and can be summarized 
briefly in the following manner. 
Logic and analytical diagrams
•	 are for “an easier explanation” and “are shorter” than scholastic methods (Weigel),
•	 are a “means in order to discover the inconsistencies” (Lambert),
•	 have the benefit that “syllogism can be overseen in one view”, and the “doubt is 
repealed” (Plocquet),
•	 have the benefit that “syllogism can be overseen in one view”, they “support clar-
ity and evidence”, and make the “invention of new truths easier” (Maaß).
Although logical diagrams are predominantly seen in early modern philosophy as 
an auxiliary tool, we are not justified to claim that analytical diagrams are just used in 
order to teach students and especially dull-witted students, similar to the so-called “bridge 
of asses”. In contrast to this, Weigel spoke of a “pons sapientium” in connection to his 
analytical diagrams.
But why were logical diagrams, and especially analytical diagrams, used in (early) 
modern logic at all, if they have no value in themselves? For further enquiry, I propose 
a hypothesis which could give an appropriate response to this question. By listing all 
logicians who used Eulerian diagrams in early modern philosophy, one finds a familiar 
resemblance between them. Most of the logicians using analytical diagrams in early 
modern philosophy are encyclopedists. 
At first glance, this may seem ambiguous but to briefly elucidate this point in the fol-
lowing short definition: In my opinion, an encyclopedist (1) is a didactic reformer, (2) is 
interested in thematic systematization and (3) in universal knowledge. A further distinc-
tion is a direct or explicit encyclopedist, who uses the term “encyclopedia” for his own 
work, whereas an indirect or implicit encyclopedist is someone who is influenced by 
a direct or explicit encyclopedist, but without claiming the term “encyclopedia” for his 
own work.
By using these definitions and a list with all the early modern logicians who use 
logic diagrams, one can comprehend the familiar resemblance suggested here. Until the 
time of Maaß, direct encyclopedist are Vives, Keckermann, Alsted, Leibniz, Weigel and 
Lange (cf. e.g. [Leinsle 1988]). An indirect encyclopedist is Lambert, who refers to the 
direct encyclopedist Francis Bacon with his “Neues Organon”.
While this is not the place to discuss the encyclopedist-thesis in detail, it is worth 
looking again into the quotes of Weigel (sect. 3.1). Although there are no indications of 
being a direct encyclopedist in these few quotes, he can be classified as a didactic re-
former, since he uses Euler diagrams explicitly instead of scholastic memorial verses. 
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And that also applies to his scholars, Leibniz and Sturm, as well as to other philosophers 
at that time (cf. [Lemanski forthcoming]). A closer examination of Vives’, Keckermann’s, 
and Alsted’s works, in which logic diagrams have been presented, will give us more 
evidence whether the encyclopedist-thesis is plausible or not.4. Arthur schopenhauer’s valuation of analytical diagrams  
in the 1820s
Another indirect encyclopedist who uses logical diagrams in the 1810s and -20s was 
Arthur Schopenhauer. Similar to Lambert and Kant, who are also known for using ana-
lytical diagrams and referring to Francis Bacon (cf. [Kim 2008; Wolters 1980: 17 et seqq.]), 
Schopenhauer has a close connection to the English encyclopedist. In section 4.1, I will 
underline this connection between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and the representational 
approach of Bacon’s encyclopedia. Furthermore, I will try to show in sect. 4.2 that Scho-
penhauer was one of the first who was interested in the history of logic and analytical 
diagrams and that he has used analytical diagrams in his main work which were espe-
cially influenced by Euler. The main section will be 4.3, in which I present a longer quote 
of Schopenhauer lectures on logic who were held in the 1820s. This quote offers a valu-
ation of analytical diagrams which go far beyond the opinions of his predecessors who 
were presented in sect. 3. In sect. 4.4, I will sketch some interpretation on Schopenhauer’s 
argument. Based on Schopenhauer’s considerations of the value of analytical diagrams, 
I am able to postdate the Bernhard/Legg-thesis, by which Eulerian diagrams become 
an end to logic until the 1960s, but rather already in the 1820s.4.1. schopenhauer encylopedistic representationalism
The connection between Bacon’s encyclopedistic approach and Schopenhauer’s phi-
losophy can be seen in the latter’s main work The World as Will and Representation, and 
especially in the paragraphs in which Schopenhauer reflects upon the task of his philoso-
phy. The main paragraph where these topics are discussed is § 15: “The present philoso-
phy,” Schopenhauer reflects, “[…] attempts to say […] what the world is.” Thus, “in order 
to present to rational knowledge the whole manifold of the world in general, according 
to its nature, condensed and summarized into a few abstract concepts” [Schopenhauer 
1958: I, 35 (= § 15)].
Similar to Bacon’s Novum Organon or to other modern philosophical works such as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Rudolf Carnap’ Der logische 
Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World), or maybe to contemporary meta-
physics (e.g. Chalmer’s, Sider’s, Heil’s books about the world), Schopenhauer’s World 
as Will and Representation can be interpreted as a theory of representationalism with an 
explicit and logical conceptual framework. “Representationalism” here means the attempt 
to reproduce the non-conceptual and merely visible world in a conceptual text. Thus, 
representationalism is guided by the metaphor of the mirror: the philosopher’s book be-
comes a mirror of the world.
This metaphor can also be found in Schopenhauer’s § 15 where he alludes to Bacon: 
The task of philosophy is “a complete recapitulation, so to speak, a reflection (german: 
Abspiegelung) of the world in abstract concepts, […]. Bacon already set philosophy this 
task”. For Schopenhauer, this quote seems to be so important that he had repeated it in § 68 
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of his main work and it can also be found in other writings of him. For example, he denied 
normative approaches in philosophy and claims: “I [sc. Schopenhauer] generally […] 
reflect upon the world and show what everything is, and how it is connected; while every-
one is left to his own discretion.”6
This attitude pertaining to representationalism can also be found in the works of Bacon 
and other encyclopedists. The encylopedistic approach of Bacon has often been inter-
preted with his list of 130 sciences in Preparative toward a Natural and Experimental 
History which was published together with the Novum Organon in 1620. Diderot has 
stated that this list was an important anticipation of the French encyclopedia (сf. [Diderot 
1876: 133 et seq., 159 et seqq.]). In Bacon’s Novum Organon, we also find the encylope-
dist idea (1) of reforming the Aristotelian logic and philosophy of science, (2) of system-
atic organization and (3) of universal knowledge (сf. [Blumenberg 1981]). According to 
his connection to Francis Bacon, Arthur Schopenhauer can be listed as an indirect ency-
clopedist, and he has used also logical diagrams in the 1810s and -20s. Similar to “ency-
clopedia”, Schopenhauer used the term “system”.4.2. Eulerian Diagrams in schopenhauer’s work
Already in the first of the four books of his main work, The World as Will and Repre-
sentation, we find some analytical diagrams, inspired by Euler. Whereas the whole work 
is a reflection of the world by using the term logic, all four books deal with either one of 
his two essential focus points, will and representation. Book I and III deals with repre-
sentation, book II and IV with will. The first book (§§ 1–16) is in turn divided in two 
parts: cognizance (§§ 3–7) and Reason (§§ 8–16). Whereas the first part makes time, space 
(§ 3) and causality (§ 4) a subject of discussion, the second part is on language (§§ 9–13), 
science (§§ 14–15) and practical reason (§ 16). The section on language is divided in four 
sub-topics, namely logic (§ 9), eristic (ibid.), metalogic (§§ 10–12) and humor (§ 13), and 
of course the Eulerian diagrams are situated in § 9.
Overall, § 9 is much too short to give a complete recapitulation of logic in general. 
In just a few pages, Schopenhauer reduces all of logic to only conceptual relations which 
are presented and organized by five possible relations: 
“(1) The spheres of two concepts are equal in all respects […],
(2) The sphere of one concept wholly includes that of another […],
6 Schopenhauer’s Letter to Julius Frauenstädt: 31th May 1854, in: [Schopenhauer 1978: 343 (no. 332)]. 
Cf. also [Lemanski 2013].
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(3) A sphere includes two or several which exclude one another, and at the same time 
fill the sphere […],
(4) Two spheres include each a part of the other […],
(5) Two spheres lie within a third, yet do not fill it […].” [Schopenhauer 1958: I, 43 
et seq. (= § 15)]
[Schopenhauer 1958: I, 41 et seqq.]. 
Only four relationships are illustrated by Eulerian circle diagrams since the first rela-
tion would be a circle which is hidden by another circle for both have the same extension. 
Thus, it does not make sense to illustrate the first relation, as the rest of § 9 does not 
provide more information on logic. Even though the second volume of the World as Will 
and Representation, which was published in 1844 for the first time, includes two chapters 
on judgments and syllogism, it is quite far from a complete recapitulation of logic — in all 
its many facets — as understood in those days.
Schopenhauer explains this lack of completeness by the fact that The World as Will 
and Representation is not the place to discuss logic in general. Since logic is an integral 
component of the world of reason, but this “schematism of concepts […] has been fairly 
well explained in several textbooks”, thus for the reader of his book “it is not necessary 
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to load the memory with these rules” [Schopenhauer 1958: I, 44 et seq.]. Scientifically 
treated by itself alone and independently of everything else, logic should only “be taught 
at the universities” [Schopenhauer 1958: I, 46], proving that Schopenhauer’s main work 
was not primarily written for a specific audience.
It is not widely known that Schopenhauer had written another version of his main 
work in 1820. This version was not addressed to a wide public, but rather to some of 
his students who had attended his lectures in Berlin in the 1820s. In this version, which 
was originally conceived to be taught at universities, Schopenhauer developed a form 
of logic which was 100 pages longer than the logical remarks in both volumes of his 
main work combined. Thus, Schopenhauer’s Berlin lectures relate to § 9 of his main 
work as “great logic” (logica magna) to “minor logic” (logica minor). In the 130 pages 
of Schopenhauer’s logica magna, we find a logic which is organized in general Aristo-
telian terms (concept, judgment, syllogisms) as well as Kantian (quantity, quality, rela-
tion, modality). Furthermore, all 130 pages are covered with Eulerian diagrams (cf. [Le-
manski 2016]).4.3. schopenhauer’s valuation of Eulerian diagrams
In contrast to other logicians who had used analytical diagrams shortly after Euler, 
such as Maaß, Ulrich, Krause, Krug, Fries, Denzinger or Bachmann (cf. [Krause 1803; 
Krug 1806; Fries 1819; Denzinger 1824; Bachmann 1828]), Schopenhauer’s lectures on 
logic are the only ones which can generally be regarded as a combination of Kant’s 
Jäsche-Logic and Euler’s Letters to a princess representing a unique form of logic in this 
period. But in contrast to Bachmann and all other mentioned logicians at that time, we find 
a reason for using Eulerian diagrams in Schopenhauer’s lectures which continues also far 
beyond the quotes which were compiled in sect. 3.
Schopenhauer’s reason to use analytical and Eulerian diagrams is given in a lon- 
ger quote at the beginning of the section dealing with the composition of concepts 
into judgments. In this section, Schopenhauer claims that logic diagrams were at 
first given by Ploucquet, Lambert and Euler (cf. [Schopenhauer 1913: 270]). Then 
he makes a longer remark on the valuation of logic diagrams unique in the history 
of proof theory:
Besonders werden diese anschaulichen 
Schemata uns die Erkenntniß der Regeln der 
Syllogistik sehr erleichtern, und uns der Be-
weise der Regeln überheben: nämlich Aris-
toteles gab für jede syllogistische Regel im-
mer einen Beweis, was eigentlich überflüssig, 
sogar der Strenge nach unmöglich ist; denn 
der Beweis selbst ist ein Schluß und setzt 
folglich die Regeln voraus: man kann ei-
gentlich diese Regeln nur deutlich machen 
und dann sieht die Vernunft ihre Nothwen-
digkeit sogleich ein, weil sie selbst der Aus-
druck der Form der Vernunft, d. h. des Den-
kens sind.
Principally, these illustratively schemes 
will be of great service to instruct in 
syllogistic rules and prevent us from 
proving those rules: since Aristotle has 
added to each syllogistic rule a proof, 
which is actually superfluous and in a 
rigid sense, quite impossible; since the 
proof is a syllogism for itself and there-
fore presupposes the rules: one can 
actually make these rules clear, so that 
reason itself realizes the necessity, 
since they [sc. the rules] are an expres-
sion of the form of reason, viz. think-
ing.
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Was Aristoteles durch seine Beweise leistete, 
das werden uns die anschaulichen Sche-
mata viel besser, und viel leichter leisten: 
denn, da sie eine ganz genaue Analogie zum 
Umfang der Begriffe haben; so lassen sie 
uns die Verhältnisse der Begriffe zu einander 
auf die leichteste Weise einsehn, nämlich 
anschaulich, und wir werden so die Noth-
wendigkeiten, welche aus diesen Verhältnis-
sen entspringen, zur leichtesten Faßlichkeit 
bringen.
Die Aristotelischen Beweise hat man schon 
längst aus der Logik weggelassen; aber man 
hat ihnen die Verdeutlichung durch anschauli-
che Schemata noch nicht so durchgängig sub-
stituirt, wie ich es thun werde. [Schopen hauer 
1913: 272; my italics; similar 357]
What Aristotle has done by proofs, this 
will done by illustratively schemes in 
a much better and easier way: since they 
[sc. illustratively schemes] have an ex-
act analogy to the comprehension of 
concepts; in that way, the relations be-
tween concepts can be seen in an easier 
light, and are especially revealing. 
In that way we will bring the necessities, 
which have their source in these rela-
tions, to the easiest comprehensibility.
In Logic, the Aristotelian proofs have 
not been used for a long time; but no 
one has formulated them by using il-
lustratively schemes in such a consistent 
manner as I will do throughout this 
chapter. 
Surprisingly, Schopenhauer combines an old view with a fresh outlook in terms 
of logical diagrams. It seems rather conventional for Schopenhauer that Eulerian diagrams 
are of  “great help for the awareness of syllogistic rules” and that proofs can be done 
“more easily” by using those diagrams. Since the time of Weigel these views have been 
reported numerous times (cf. sect. 3), yet a completely new aspect refers to proof theory: 
Eulerian diagrams are not only a means for logical reasoning, but rather they shall replace 
the traditional way of proving syllogistic rules.
Schopenhauer’s argument on proof theory is not wholly easy to plot. He explains how 
traditional proofs of syllogisms are problematic since they are ensnared in a petitio prin-
cipii: Every traditional proof in the Aristotelian sense tries to verify a special form of 
syllogism. As a conclusion, the correctness and validity of a syllogism shall be given; yet 
in order to prove a syllogism a syllogism is required, and this required and presupposed 
syllogism plays a role in the major premise of proof. Thus, the conclusion is identical 
with the premise it presupposes, and therefore the whole traditional proof theory is prob-
lematic. Moreover, it could be argued, that even if proof verifies a conclusion with an-
other syllogism as a major premise, the syllogism of the major premise has to become 
a conclusion if it is proved itself. However, even if this reduction can be accepted, it pre-
supposes an initial proof in which conclusion and major premise are necessarily identical 
(formal or even material). Thus, avoiding a petitio principii leads to an infinite regress 
or to a dogmatic assumption.
Schopenhauer sees the solution for this problem in logic, especially in Euler diagrams: 
Syllogisms, rules or proofs can only “become clear”. This making or becoming clear is 
not only much easier, but also much better than the traditional Aristotelian theory of proofs. 
Euler’s diagrams are an improvement since they prove syllogisms without presupposing 
deductive or syllogistic reasoning itself, insofar as Eulerian diagrams seem to be the only 
solution to avoid the above mentioned tropes of Greek scepticism. Even if Schopen-
hauer repeats some of the advantages of logic diagrams known from history, he assigns 
analytical diagrams a role in proof theory, proving to be unique in the history of logic 
diagrams.
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It is difficult to resolve whether Schopenhauer is justified to appreciate Eulerian dia-
grams as an end to traditional proof theory. Most likely, it depends on which school of 
logic and philosophy one adheres to. However, since it cannot be elaborated on in detail, 
I will only provide two general observations concerning the (1) tradition and (2) con-
tinuation of Schopenhauer’s argument.
(1) At first, Schopenhauer’s sceptical argument is not unique. It has been advanced 
more or less by authors such as Sextus Empiricus, Francis Bacon, John Locke or John 
Stuart Mill who have criticized the fundamentals of Greek syllogistic reasoning.7 Gen-
erally speaking, Aristotelians and Stoicists have argued that the proof of incomplete or 
imperfect syllogism can only be done with perfect syllogisms, e.g. Barbara and Celar-
ent which depend itself on the dictum de omni et nullo or the five unproved Chrysip-
pean syllogisms depending on the so-called dictum de si et aut (cf. [Barnes 2007: ch. 5]). 
For Sextus or Mill, and similar to Schopenhauer, the reduction or the dicta are prob-
lematic for several reasons, yet all lead to sceptical tropes (dogmatic, circular, infinite 
regress et al.). But whereas sceptical empiricists such as Bacon or Mill have replaced 
deduction with induction, Schopenhauer has used geometrical diagrams in order to avoid 
these tropes.
Thus, what is unique in Schopenhauer is his solution to scepticism. Nevertheless, the 
objection it might be raised that Schopenhauer is making a classical categorical mistake 
which is concerned with almost the exact categories illustrated by Aristotle: “One cannot, 
therefore, prove by crossing from another kind — e.g. something geometrical by arith-
metic.” (An. post. 75a38: “Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι, οἷον τὸ 
γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικῆι.”) However, Schopenhauer anticipates this objection with 
reference to the exact analogy between the conceptual and the visual, as Eulerian diagrams 
illustrative schemes “have an exact analogy to the comprehension of concepts”.
However, is Schopenhauer justified in claiming such an analogy? A similar question 
is currently being discussed under topics such as “isomorphism”, “homomorphism”, and 
“Graphic-Linguistic Distinction” by modern logicians (cf. e.g. [Bernhard 2001: 62 et 
seqq.; Shimojima 1999]). Also in the history of logic diagrams we have found that Weigel 
and Maaß confirm that there is an analogy between conceptual logic and visual geometry. 
Furthermore, Weigel and others have claimed that there is an analogy between concep-
tual and visual reasoning, which can not only be found in the works of the old Mathema-
ticians, but also in Aristoteles himself. (Cf. sect. 3.1. Furthermore [Weigelius 1669: 146; 
Weisius, Langius 1712: 248].) And indeed, in Aristotle we find some indications for 
geometrical, as well as conceptual descriptions concerning the fundaments of syllogisms 
(for example An. Pr. 24b25 et seqq.).
(2) Moreover, Schopenhauer’s argument is not only restricted to logical proofs in 
Aristotelian syllogism. Jean-Yves Béziau has shown that Schopenhauer has applied 
a similar argument to that discussed in sect. 4.3 also to Euclidean geometry (cf. [Béziau 
1993: 81–88]). Schopenhauer claims that geometry is also problematic if it is based on 
mere logical reasoning and although the argument is much more elaborated on in his Berlin 
lecture in the 1820s, it depends more so on the thesis given in his dissertation of 1813 and 
7 Cf. Sextus Empiricus, PH, II 156 et seqq.; Francis Bacon, Distributio Operis; Novum Organum, I 13 et 
seqq., I 54; John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4, XVII § 4; [Mill 1858: esp. 112–121].
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in the World as Will and Presentation of 1818. In all three texts, Schopenhauer argues that 
Euclid had made the mistake to prove geometrical propositions with logical reasoning. 
For Beziau, Schopenhauer’s argument is similar to Árpád Szabó’s claim that Euclid has 
only preferred logical instead of visual reasoning, due to the influence of eleatic phi-
losophy within his epoch. The better option would have been, if Euclid had focus on in-
tuitive, visual or diagrammatic proofs instead of a systematic-deductive system of axioms 
which is unnecessary.
Applied to Geometry, Schopenhauer’s argument may have anticipated Brouwer’s 
intuitionism (cf. e.g. [Koetsier 2005]). Yet, Béziau claimed that there are important dif-
ferences, especially concerning the role of the principle of sufficient reasons. Therefore, 
it seems more obvious when current researchers claim a stronger connection between 
Schopenhauer’s argument and Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. Similarly, over 
the last few years one can find more and more discussions as to whether Schopenhauer 
can be classified as a pioneer of the proof without words movement (cf. [Schreiber 2003]).
Nonetheless, points, (1) and (2), have to be assigned as general observations concern-
ing the tradition and continuation of Schopenhauer’s argument. For the topic of the pres-
ent paper, it is more important that Schopenhauer considered logic diagrams as having 
value in themselves and being an end to logical research. The increase in the value of 
logic diagrams is based on Schopenhauer’s opinion that spatial intuition has an a priori 
structure, on the one hand, but also that conceptual usage is based on the world a poste-
riori, as given in sect. 4.1. 5. conclusion
I have examined two theses, (1) the Gardner/Baron-thesis, which argues that since the 
Middle-Ages some logic diagrams are just means in order to teach dull-witted students; 
(2) the Bernhard/Legg-thesis, which states that since the 1960s logic diagrams become 
the end to research. As a result of the previous sections, it can be said that both theses 
cannot be broadened to all logic diagrams or to the whole history of logic diagrams.
For (1), it is true that logic diagrams are used as a means in early modern philosophy. 
They were used for “an easier explanation” (Weigel), “in order to discover inconsisten-
cies” (Lambert), since “syllogism can be overseen in one view” and the “doubt is repealed” 
(Plocquet) or because of the benefit that they “support clarity and evidence”, enabling the 
“invention of new truths more easier” (Maaß). Since the presented quotes do not provide 
evidence for the fact that all — or even the majority — of logic diagrams were used in 
order to teach dull-witted students, this part of (1) is not generally true, especially not for 
analytical diagrams. A more likely scenario for the use of analytical diagrams is that they 
were used by didactic reformers with encyclopedic concerns, but admittedly, this hypoth-
esis deserves to be studied in more detail.
For (2), it is true that logic diagrams have become the ends to research since the 1960s. 
But this does not mean that there are not any attempts in history to value the benefits of 
visual reasoning. In Schopenhauer’s lectures of the 1820s, the first quote in history in 
which Eulerian diagrams were praised as the end of traditional proof theory, can be found. 
For Schopenhauer, there is a petitio principii in Aristotelian proof theory, since “the proof 
is a syllogism for itself and presupposes therefore the rules”. For that reason, he consid-
ers the use of Euler diagrams to be better than the Aristotelian method of verifying syl-
logism.
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Finally, attention should be drawn to the fact that all historical material provided 
in this article is based on inductive investigation: it may be possible that there are more 
quotes in the history of Euler diagrams, which can be addressed to either the Gardner/
Baron-thesis or the Bernhard/Legg-thesis, as well as to other logicians who have used 
diagrams. However, the absolute certainty of having achieved “wholeness” can never 
be fully attained in historical investigations, as the material presented in the preceding 
pages is more than a contribution to the historiography of analytical diagrams, as new 
perspectives regarding old quotations on the use of diagrams can be found. It is desired 
that the quotes and  illustrations from Weigel to Schopenhauer can confirm this assess-
ment.
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